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WHERE MAY ONE PARTY REQUIRE HIS ADVERSARY
TO ATTEND PENDING ACTION TO GIVE HIS
DEPOSITION UNDER THE FEDERAL
RULES'?
J. H. MCCHORD' :"
In order to indicate some of the different aspects of this
question let us assume that A, a resident of California, sued
11, a resident of Louisville, in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville. Assume
further that after answer was filed, and for the purposes of dis-
covcry or for use as evidence in the action,
(1) B serves notice on A's Louisville attorney that A's depo-
sition' will be taken at Louisville at a designated time
and place. Must A appear?
(2) Suppose B notifies A that his deposition will be taken in
Chicago at a designated time and place. Must A appear
there?
On the other hand let us assume that A serves notice on
B, who in the meantime has moved to Chicago, that his deposi-
tion will be taken at Louisville. Must B return to Louisville
for the purpose of giving his deposition? What difference, if
any, would be made in the answers to questions (1) and (2)
above if B had sued A in Louisville and process had been
served on him there? In each of the foregoing who must bear
the deponent's traveling expenses, hotel bills and attorney's
fees ?
* A. B., Centre College, 1909; M.A., 1910; LL.B., Harvard, 1913.
General Solicitor, Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company. Mem-
ber, Louisville Bar Association, Kentucky State Bar Association,
American Bar Association.
Here and throughout this discussion the word "deposition" is
used to mean "deposition upon oral examination."
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It will be helpful before considering the provisions of the
Federal Rules with respect to these questions to summarize
briefly the rights of a litigant to take the deposition of his
adversary, and the authority of the courts prior to the Federal
Rules to direct that such depositions be taken. In the absence
of the grant of specific authority by statute neither the common-
law courts nor the equity judges had authority to order one
party to appear and give his deposition before trial.' From a
historical standpoint, at any rate, the taking of an adversary's
deposition before trial must be regarded, not as a right developed
by the courts or announced in early statutory enactments, but as
a privilege or favor granted by comparatively recent legislation
or by rules adopted pursuant to such legislation.
Equity Rules 47 and 58 and sections 639 and 644 of the
Judicial Code3 extended the rights of parties to take the deposi-
tions of their adversaries pending action in the federal courts.
Since all of these provisions have been superseded by the F,,d-
eral Rules there is no occasion to consider them in detail. In
passing it may be noted, however, that a party was authorized
to take the deposition of his adversary under the conditions pre-
scribed in the Code for the taking of the depositions of other
witnesses.4 But since no method was provided for enforcing
attendance except the use of a subpoena there were automatic-
ally imposed definite limitations on the selection of the place for
the taking of the deposition.5
The heading of Rule 26 is "Depositions Pending Action."
Rule 26(a) is in part as follows:
"When Depositions May be Taken. By leave of court after
jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over prop-
erty which is the subject of the action or without such leave after
an answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether
a party or not, may be taken at the instance of any party by
deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories for
the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the action or
for both purposes. The attendance of witnesses may be com-
pelled by the use of subpoena as provided in Rule 45. Deposi-
tions shall be taken only in accordance with these rules."
2 1 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) sec. 190, p.
262; 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) p. 2445; 9 A. & E. ENCYCL.
or L. (2d ed. 1898) p. 313; Hanks Dental Assn. v. International
Tooth Crown Co., 194 U. S. 303, 48 L. Ed. 989, 991 (1904).
'28 U. S. C. A. secs. 639 and 644.
Id. sec. 639.
' See in this connection Lowrey v. Kusworm, 66 Fed. 539 (1895);
Blood v. Morrin, 140 Fed. 918 (1905); Hartman v. Feenaughty et al.,
139 Fed. 887 (1905); Ilawks v. Yancey, 2 F. (2d) 471 (1924).
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All (if the provisions of this rule apply whether the depo-
sition of a party or that of a witness who is not a party is to be
taken. It will he noted that nothing is expressly stated as to
the pawcr where the deposition may or must be taken. It is pro-
vided, however, that "depositions shall be taken only in accord-
aice with these rules." With respect to the latter it has been
,-lid:
"The purpose of this provision is twofold: (1) to provide ex-
clusively when a party is entitled to take depositions, and (2)
to establish a uniform procedure for the taking of depositions
in the federal courts * *
()t' of the questions which we nmust consider is whether
t]o' restrictions that apply to the place at which a witness, not a
jiarty, may be required to attend to give his deposition also
apply when a party is to he the deponent. Rule 30(a) is in part
as folliw"-:
"Notice of Examination: Time and Place. A party desiring to
take the deposition of any person upon oral examination shall
give reasonable notice in writing to every other party to the
action. The notice shall state the time and place for taking
the deposition and the name and address of each person to be
examined, if known, and, if the name is not known, a general
description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or
group to which he belongs."
This rule, like 26(a), applies whether the deposition of a
party or of a witness not a party is to be taken. According to
time heading it purports to state the place at which the deposition
of a party or a witness, pending action, may be taken. The only
limitation or restriction stated is the place designated in the
jimt w. In so far as express provision is concerned, it makes no
difference in this respect whether plaintiff or defendant seeks the
dilposition or whether there is any relation between the place
,seletted and the residence of the prospective deponent or the
district in which the action is pending. There are no conditions
whatever imposed on the party in the choice of the place that
1w may designate.
The headings of Rules 45 and 45 (d) are, respectively, '"Sub-
pltema" and "Subpoena for Taking Depositions; Place of Exam-
ination." Subparagraph (1) of 45(d) provides for the issuance
"2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) p. 2468.
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of subpoenas for taking depositions. Rule 43(d) (2) is as fol-
lows:
"A resident of the district in which the deposition is to be
taken may be required to attend an examination only in the
county wherein he resides or is employed or transacts his busi-
ness in person. A nonresident of the district may be required
to attend only in the county wherein he is served with a sub-
poena, or within 40 miles from the place of service, or at such
other place as is fixed by an order of court."
It would be in accordance with the Rules if a party to
litigation pending in Kentucky should serve notice on a resident
of California, not a party to the suit, that his deposition would
be taken in Kentucky. However, such a person could disregard
the notice with impunity. The only way he could be compelled
to attend to give his deposition would be by subpoena. In view
of 45 (d) (2) a subpoena may not be used to compel a resident of
California to come to Kentucky to testify.
The compulsion that indirectly but quite effectively forces
a party to attend and give his deposition upon the mere written
notice of his adversary is contained in Rule 37(d) which is in
part as follows:
"Failure of Party to Attend. * If a party or an officer or
managing agent of a party wilfully fails to appear before the
officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a
proper notice, * * * the court on motion and notice may strike
out all or any part of any pleading of that party, or dismiss
the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a judgment
by default against that party."
Accordingly, while a party may have a subpoena served
upon his adversary to require his attendance for the taking of
his deposition, that is not necessary.7 If, however, a subpoena
or a subpoena duces tecum is served, the coercive power of the
court by punishment for contempt to compel attendance is re-
stricted to the limits prescribed in Rule 45(d) (2) quoted above."
There is some basis for the view that those limits apply to a party
upon whom only a notice has been served. The first sentence
of this rule is so drafted as to apply generally to parties and
ICollins v. Wayland et al., 139 F. (2d) 677, 678 (C. C. A. 9th
1944); Millinocket Theatre, Inc. v. Kurson, 35 F. Supp. 754 (N. D. Me.
1940); French v. Zalstem-Zalessky et al., 1 F. R. D. 240 (S. D. N. Y.
1940); Spaeth v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 1 F. R. D. 729, 730
(S. D. N. Y 1941).
'Laverett v. Continental Briar Pipe Co., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 81
(E. D. N. Y. 1938).
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otier witnesses and is not confined to those upon whom a sub-
loena has been served. It is interesting to notice in this con-
jiection, that it is said in Moore's Federal Practice :9
"The notice must also state the place at which the deposition
will be taken. In selecting a place for taking a deposition, the
party taking it should bear in mind the provisions of Rule
45(d) (2) which limit the places at which deponents can be
compelled to attend an examination by deposition."
Although this apparently is the only discussion in this
treatise of the place at which depositions may be taken, the
author fails to point out that this statement applies -when the
proIspective deponent is a party only if a subpoena is also to be
itscd. However, that this is the author's view is indicated by
the index reference to this discussion: "Place of deposition by
pelson. xubpoeia( d."
The headings of Rules 45 and 45(d) and the second sen-
tene of 45(d) (2) indicate that the whole of that rule relates
to a isubpoena and does not restrict a party in the selection of
the place at which his adversary will be required to attend by
notice and without the use of a subpoena. However, it is unfor-
tinate that the rules were so drafted that it is necessary to go
through these processes of deduction to ascertain the meaning
of the Rules and of the discussion of them by the authorities.
The Rules leave the party seeking to examine his adversary
wholly unrestricted in selecting the place stated in the notice.
This notice sets in motion the machinery for taking the deposi-
tion so chat, regardless of the expense, loss of time and incon-
venience the trip would entail, the prospective deponent takes a
dangerous chance if he fails to appear at the designated place
without having obtained a court order changing the effect of the
notice. He may, if he acts promptly and shows good cause,
obtain protection under Rule 30(b) and, moreover, the enforce-
ment of the penalty prescribed by 37(d) for the failure to attend
in accordance with the notice is left within the discretion of the
ourt. Rule 30(h) is in part as follows:
"Orders for the Protection of Parties and Deponents. After
notice is served for taking a deposition by oral examination,
upon motion seasonably made by any party or by the person to
be examined, and upon notice and for good cause shown, the
court in which the action is pending may make an order that
"Vol. 2, p. 2571 (1938).
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the deposition shall not be taken, or that it may be taken only
at some designated place other than that stated in the notice,
or that it may be taken only on written interrogatories, * * *
or the court may make any other order which justice requires to
protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or
oppression."
Whether the court, in response to such a motion, orders that
the deposition be taken at the place designated in the notice, or
amends the notice by designating some other place, it would
seem that the only penalty for failure to attend is that author-
ized by Rule 37(d) ; in other words, that Rule 30(b) may-be
used by the court only to provide a shield to protect the prospec-
tive deponent and not as a source of authority for orders directed
against him, or for punishment for failure to comply with such
orders.'l
Courts have made the following rulings in cases where the
plaintiff resided outside of the district in which the suit was
pending and defendant sought to take his deposition (it thc pla
where the suit weas brought:
(1) The court dismissed the complaint when plaintiff failed
to attend after the court ordered him to do so. It also
said the notice directing the plaintiff to appear at the
seat of the court was proper."
(2) The court overruled plaintiff corporation's objection to
sending its managing agent from Wisconsin to New York
at its expense in response to notice given by third party
defendant.'
2
(3) Plaintiff resided in India and had advised his counsel he
could not return on account of transportation difficulties
caused by the war. Nevertheless, the court dismissed his
complaint on his failure to attend pursuant to defendant's
notice.'
3
(4) The court ordered the plaintiff to attend, but at the court-
house instead of the offices of the defendant's counsel, as
had been stated in the notice. 14
'" But compare in this connection the language of the opinion in
Collins v. Wayland, et al., 139 F. (2d) 677, 678 (C. C. A. 9th, 1944).
" Id. pp. 677, 678.
' Fruit Growers Co-op. v. California Pie & Baking Co., 3 F. R. D.
206 (E. D. N. Y. 1942).
I- Roerich v. Esquire Coronet, Inc. et al., 1 F. R. D. 692 (S. D.
N. Y. 1941).11IHavell v. Time, Inc., 1 F. R. D. 439 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
JURISDICTION-ATTENDANCE OF PARTIES
(5) The court declined to order the plaintiff to attend except
on condition that defendant pay his traveling expenses
and hotel bills on the trip from Florida to New York and
return. It appeared, however, that the plaintiff might
lose his jo if he were required to go to New York.15
In Krir v. Mu.chel et al.') plaintiff, a resident of Bethle-
hem, Pennsylvania, brought suit in the Southern District of New
York. Defendant gave notice to take his deposition in Allentown,
Pennsylvnnia. InI sustaining plaintiff's motion to modify the
notice the court said : "Of course the examination of the plaintiff
should be had in Bethlehem, Pa., -" S 
:: "
Courts have made the following rulings in cases where
ploij at ha.s .ought to take defend, nt's deposition under the cir-
,,mnstances indicated below:
(1) In Fairwater Transp. Co. Inc. v. Chris-Craft Corp.17
defendant's main offices were located at Algonac, MIichi-
gan, near Detroit, and plaintiff sought to take, in New
York, the deposition of defendant through its officers.
The court ordered that the deposition be taken at Algonac
or Detroit at plaintiff's option, and directed that reason-
able expense of defendant's counsel be allowed.
(2) In La'rctt v. Continental Briar Pipe Co.'s suit was
brought in Brooklyn, Kings County, in the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York where defendant has its principal place
of business, and Gevirman, its president, resided. Plain-
tiff s ought to take the latter's deposition in New York
City which is in a different district and county from that
in which the suit was pending. The court quoted Rule
45(d) (2) and said:
"Gevirman therefore should not be required to attend
an examination in the County of New York as he does
not reside nor is he employed nor transacts his business
in person in New York. The examination should pro-
ceed in the County of Kings.""
'Stevens v. Minder Construction Corp., 3 F. R. D. 498 (S. D.
N. Y. 1943).
29 F. Supp. 482 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
"1 F. R. D. 509 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
"25 F. Supp. 80, 81 (E. D. N. Y. 1938).
'Id. at p. 81. The Laverett Case was cited in Cohen v. Penn-
sylvania R. Co., 30 F. Supp. 419 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1939) as authority
for the conclusion that the deposition of an officer of a non-resident
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However, in this case plaintiff moved for an order for a sub-
poena duces tecum and accordingly there is little doubt that
Rule 45(d) (2) would apply.
In the Fruit Growers Case, supra,-0 the reasons given by
the court for requiring plaintiff to produce the witnesses and at
its expense were: "defendants have the right to examine the
plaintiff by its officers," and "it does not seem to me that plain-
tiff, who sought relief in this forum, should have the right to
require the payment of the expenses of the taking of the depo-
sitions in the forum of its choice, of its officers or managing
agents."' ' -  The Rules do not provide or indicate that the selec-
tion of the forum has anything to do with the right of one party
to require his adversary to return to that forum to give his depo-
sition, though, of course, it is a circumstance which the court
may consider in exercising its discretion in the matter.
In the Stevens Case, supra,22 the court ruled plantiff did
not have to attend unless defendant paid his traveling expenses
and hotel bills. The opinion indicates the view that the Rules
merely authorize the court to require plaintiff to attend on such
conditions as it might in its discretion impose.
2 3
"That there may be cases in which oral examination of a
plaintiff in the presence of defendant, and by counsel familiar
with the matter in issue, is essential to an adequate presentation
of the facts, cannot be doubted. :: * * Whether this was a case
requiring such examination cotild be determined properly only
corporate defendant "should be taken in Philadelphia, the principal
place of business of the defendant." In Moore v. Geo. A. Hormel &
Co., 4 F. R. D. 15 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1942), the court granted defend-
ant's motion that the deposition of its officer be taken in Minnesota
where its principal place of business was located but ordered that
if plaintiff did not pay the fee of defendant's New York attorney
and his traveling expenses incident to the trip to Minnesota, the
deposition should be taken in New York, provided plaintiff pay the
witness's traveling expenses including his hotel bill.
-Fruit Growers Co-op. v. California Pie & Baking Co., 3 F. R. D.
206 (E. D. N. Y. 1942).
21 Id. at pp. 206-208. Since this article was prepared, the Dis-
trict Court of Delaware, in Sprague Electric Co. v. Cornell-Dubilier
Elec. Corp., 4 F. R. D. 113, declined to require plaintiff, a foreign
corporation, to send its officers to the seat of the court to give their
depositions and announced the general rule applicable to both plain-
tiff and defendant, which also had its principal place of business in
another state: "The taking of the depositions of a corporate party
by its officers and agents should be taken at the main place of busi-
ness of the corporation, or where it has its books and records."
-Stevens v. Minder Construction Corp., 3 F. R. D. 498 (S. D. N.
Y. 1943).
"Id. at p. 498.
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upon hearing the parties; --' * *. Whether 2 ': the plaintiff
should in fairness be required to come to the place where he
instituted suit, or the defendants be obliged to go with counsel
to the plaintiff's place of residence, was, likewise, a matter which
could properly be determined only upon hearing the parties;
All will agree that the rules should, in the manner that
would work best iu practice, provide for the determination by
the court, in the light of the circumstances of each particular
cast, of the question as to whether, and upon what terms, one
party will be required to go on a journey from the place of his
residence to give his deposition at the instance and for the benefit
of his adversary.
Making all due allowance for the differences in the facts
and circumstances it is hard to reconcile with each other all of
the decisions and the reasons given therefor by the courts in the
,ipnion summarized above. The apparent conflict may result
from the failure of the Rules to prescribe a guide or criterion to
lie applied by the court in reaching a decision as to the place at
which a party will be required to attend and in determining
whether or not his traveling expenses and attorney's fees should
be allowed. Another possible explanation is that there is a diver-
ellce in the views of some of the courts as to whether the Rules
give to every litigant the right to a pre-trial oral examination of
his adversary or whether they merely give the right to take his
It slimonq with authority in the court to determine, in the light
of the ,ircumstances of each case, whether it shall be upon writ-
ten interrogatories or oral examination, and if the latter, upon
what terms.
It is beyond the scope of this article to attempt to deternmine
whether the criticism implied in these suggested explanations is
justified. Assuming for the purpose of the discussion that there
is no sufficient reason for making the Rules more definite in
these particulars, it is, nevertheless, pertinent to suggest that
the question as to whether one party may be compelled to go
ol a journey from his home and at his own expense to give his
depisition at the instance and for the benefit of his adversary,
should be left to the discretion of the court.
-, While this excerpt is from a dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Brandeis and Mr. Justice Holmes, it is from a portion of the opinion
that does not conflict with that of the majority. Kentucky Finance
Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corp., 262 U. S. 544, 552, 67 L.
Ed. 1112 (1923).
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It is suggested that the Rules should be amended so as to
defite the place at which one party may by notice alone require
the other party to attend (e. g., the restrictions of 45 (d) (2)
applicable to a subpoena should be made also to apply to a notice
to an adversary) with authority in the court on ,notion of thlc
party seeking the deposition, and for good cause shown, to
require the adversary to appear beyond those limits at a place
and upon terms to be fixed by the court. As a matter of fair-
ness, and in accordance with accepted practice, the burden of
going to the court in the first instance and of making a showing
as to the propriety of a journey from the prospective deponent's
residence should be upon the party who seeks the deposition
rather than upon the one who is to give it. Such an amendment
would tend to minimize the use of the rule to harrass or exert
pressure upon an opponent. A definite rule for determining the
boundaries within which a party may be required to appear
would be helpful to the one who nmust draft the notice as well as
the one to whom it is addressed. No reason is perceived for
making a distinction in this respect between those summoned by
notice alone and prospective deponents summoned by subpoena
or subpoena duces tecum. It was not at all necessary in order
to give "an unlimited right of discovery''2 to remove all limi-
tations on the place at which an adversary may be required to
attend. Professor E. R. Sunderland has shown that the discov-
cry provisions in the Federal Statutes and Equity Rules, re-
ferred to above, were inadequate and that there is no uniformity
in the discovery procedures in the various states.2' He does
not suggest, however, that experience in either state or federal
practice has indicated a need for the provision in the Rules
which we have ventured to criticize.
It has been suggested that the reason for their failure to
impose any restriction on the place to be selected is "in order
that full discretion might be invested in the court in this re-
gard." It is obvious that at the outset "full discretion" is vested
not in the court, but in the party seeking the deposition. lie
may not submit the matter to the court. It is only after he has
served notice designating the place he has selected and after
I Advisory Committee's note to Rule 30 (b).
Report of Proceedings of the Institute on Federal Rules, Cleve-
land, 0. (1938) p. 277.
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1) motion "seasonably made," and (2) for good cause shown
by his adi,ersary, that the court is authorized to exercise dis-
,retion in the matter. On the other hand, if the Rules were
amended as we have suggested, in most cases there would be no
ri1casion to trouble the court because the deposition would-be
taken at the placed prescribed by the rule. In the exceptional
v.ase where the person seeking the deposition wishes it taken be-
ymid those limits, he should not only be permitted but required
to briag the matter to the court's attention at the outset and
before the empty formality has been observed of serving a
nti-e statingf" the place to which he knows his opponent will
ubje-t.
It is revo(Inized, of course, that without amendment of the
Rules, the courts can, under Rule 30(b), and, in most cases, will
prevent this defect from resulting in serious hardship or in-
justive. Assuming for this reason that no such amendment as
the one we have suggested will be adopted, we submit that if the
Rles really mean that however inreasonable may be the selec-
tion of th( place stated in the notice the prospective deponent
olast, at his oil.n expense, appear there or promptly proceed to
obtait an ordcr for his protections, the courts and other authori-
ties should, for the benefit of all concerned, state that meaning
more elearly and unequivocally than they have yet done.
